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Purpose of review: To date, there has been little analysis of the degree to which emerging incentive initiatives are
permissible under Canadian law. The purpose of this review is to examine the relevant law – including legislation
and case law – in order to clarify the legality of existing proposed incentive schemes.
Sources of information: Legislation and case law.
Findings: Organ donation is governed by provincial legislation that, in general, bans the exchange of any “benefit”
or any form of “valuable consideration” in return for an organ. As such, these laws are tremendously restrictive and
could have significant implications for emerging and proposed procurement policy.
Implications: Given the need for innovative, ethically appropriate policies to increase donation rates, we suggest
that the time is right to rethink the potentially restrictive nature of Canada’s organ donation laws.
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But de l’article: À ce jour, il y a eu peu d’analyse légale des incitatifs pour le don d’organes au Canada. Le but de
cet article est d’examiner les lois relatives au don d’organes afin de déterminer la légalité de différents incitatifs.
Sources d’informations: Les textes de loi et la jurisprudence.
Résultats: Le don d’organes relève de compétences provinciales, lesquelles, de manière générale, interdisent au
donneur de recevoir tout avantage ou compensation en échange de son organe. Ces lois sont extrêmement
restrictives et peuvent donc avoir des conséquences significatives sur de futures politiques de don et de
prélèvement d’organes. Ceci étant dit, il est cependant difficile d’émettre des prédictions définitives sur les
interprétations possibles de la loi par les tribunaux.
Implications: Compte tenu la nécessité d’augmenter le don d’organes via des politiques innovatrices et
éthiquement acceptables, nous croyons qu’il est opportun de revoir les lois canadiennes sur le don d’organes afin
d’éliminer les aspects restrictifs de ces dernières.
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http://www.cjkhd.org/content/1/1/7What was known before
There seems be an assumption that the existing ban on
valuable consideration in the context of organ donation
applies only to direct financial payments in exchange for
organs.
What this adds
It is clear that existing legislative bans on the use of, for
example, “valuable consideration” have broad application
and may apply to a range of existing and proposed in-
centive initiatives.
Introduction
The need to increase rates of organ donation has re-
ceived growing attention in both the healthcare policy
literature [1-5] and in the popular press [6]. Canada’s do-
nation rates fall well below many other OECD nations
[7,8] and as the demand continues to grow, the pressure
to find ways to improve the supply of organs intensifies.
The perennial organ shortage has led to the introduction
of, and speculation about, a number of policy reforms
[9], including the use of financial incentive schemes for
both living and deceased donation (Table 1).
Canada’s organ donation system is premised on altruism
[10] and Canadian lawmakers have gone to great lengths
to ensure that the system is structured to prevent com-
mercial exchange of organs. The provincial laws that formTable 1 Example incentive initiatives
Incentive V
Priority as a potential recipient in exchange for donating L
re
Potential donors who indicate a willingness to donate or who register to
donate post mortem are placed on a priority list to receive an organ
should they need one [3,40].




Events hosted by organ procurement organizations in order to recognize
living and deceased donors [41-43].




These programs facilitate kidney donations by pairing those in need of a
kidney with a willing but non-compatible donor with other such pairs.





Donors often incur expenses during the organ donation process. Some
programs reimburse donors for these expenses, including travel, food
and accommodation costs [3,4,12-14].
Funeral expenses Y
le
A system whereby donors have all or a portion of funeral expenses paid
for or reimbursed [1-3,25,26].
Tax credit Y
A system whereby donors are granted a tax credit by either the federal
or provincial government for donation organs [3,44].
Cash incentives Y
Payment of money for organs [1,2,4,33].the primary framework for our organ donation system –
and which formalize the altruistic foundations of the sys-
tem – have been in place for years [11]. But as the clinical
and policymaking communities struggle to meet the grow-
ing demand for organs, a range of initiatives have been
considered [3,12-14] or rolled out that provide incentives
or, as they are often framed, seek to remove disincentives.
Despite this policy trend, there seems to have been lit-
tle analysis of whether (and, if so, what types of ) incen-
tives are permissible under Canadian law. In this paper
we review the relevant law on organ donation and ask
whether there is scope for lawful incentive strategies.
We also suggest that, in light of existing and proposed
initiatives and the clear demand for organs, a more flex-
ible approach to regulation – one that has room for
evidence-based and ethically sound innovation – is war-
ranted. As we will see, many of the proposed and existing
initiatives may conflict with current law. But our goal is
not to discourage the introduction of such policies. On the
contrary, we feel the time is right to rethink the potentially
restrictive nature of Canada’s organ donation laws.
Review
The Law
In Canada, the provinces and territories are responsible
for regulating organ and tissue transplantation. Legisla-
tion in each province and territory sets norms regardingaluable consideration?
ikely. Donor has potential to receive a substantial benefit in return for
gistration.
ikely. While the provisions of gifts to donors could be viewed as a form
f reward that would, technically, be a form “valuable consideration”, it
ems too insignificant to be considered a policy concern (more a
mbolic gesture).
ikely. If participating in the program increases your chance of your
tended recipient receiving an organ, it could be viewed as a benefit
d, as a result, valuable consideration (hence the modification of the
S law to allow such programs).
ossibly. The degree to which these programs could constitute a
enefit” would likely need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
d may depend, inter alia, on the degree to which payment is truly for
uantifiable costs. This would be equally true for policies that seek to
rovide money as a way to compensate for pain and suffering.
es. The payment of costs of this nature would clearly infringe existing
gislation as it is the provision of a benefit in exchange for donation.
es. Even though not a direct payment, still an obvious financial benefit.
es.
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amounts to a ban on the buying and selling of organs.
Although there is some variation in the exact wording of
the relevant provisions, every province has a prohibition
that, taken literally, is tremendously broad in scope.
Seven of the thirteen statutes state that “No person shall
buy, sell or otherwise deal in, directly or indirectly, for a
valuable consideration, any tissue for a transplant, or
any body or parts other than blood or a blood constitu-
ent, for therapeutic purposes, medical education or sci-
entific research” [15-21]. In Québec, the Civil Code
provides that “[t]he alienation by a person of a part or
product of his body shall be gratuitous…” [22]. In other
provinces, such as Alberta, the legislation prohibits the
exchange of organs for “any reward or benefit” [10].
In law, “valuable consideration” is expansively defined;
it is understood to mean any detriment incurred by one
party to an agreement, or any benefit received by the
other party [23,24]. Consideration is much more than a
mere exchange of money for goods or services. A classic
example that highlights the breadth of the legal concep-
tion of valuable consideration arises from an English
case, Chappell & Co v Nestlé [25], wherein the House of
Lords held that chocolate bar wrappers could be viewed
as consideration. Likewise, the concept of “reward or
benefit” is extremely far-reaching. In referring to “valu-
able consideration” and “reward or benefit”, the statutes
arguably prohibit any exchange that could be viewed as
creating an incentive to donate organs.
If an individual or organization were to challenge the
legal legitimacy of a particular incentive program, the
court would be required to interpret the provision that
prohibits dealing for an organ “for a valuable consider-
ation”. Based on the broad approach to the meaning of
consideration in the case law, the court would very likely
be persuaded that the legislature chose the language of
“valuable consideration” deliberately, and with a view to
including much more than an outright purchase of or-
gans. In other words, if the legislature had intended only
to prohibit the exchange of cash for organs or tissues,
then the provision could have been drafted much more
narrowly. The choice of the language of consideration
suggests that all programs that can be viewed as provid-
ing a benefit to the donor in exchange for an organ
could be interpreted as being contrary to the spirit of
the legislative prohibition, and therefore illegal.
It is important to note that our interpretation of “valu-
able consideration” is based on the common law of con-
tract. Canadian organ donation legislation makes it an
offence to contravene of the law. This implies that the law
may be interpreted more narrowly, in keeping with the
“strict construction” approach used in the context of penal
legislation, where uncertainty or ambiguity is resolved in
favour of the accused person [26]. Still, as noted above,valuable consideration should be viewed as much more
than money. It can be almost anything that serves as a rea-
son, motive or inducement for entering into an agreement.
Incentive policies
As noted, numerous incentive mechanisms have been ei-
ther implemented or proposed [See Table 1], including
the provision of a tax credit to living donors and the
payment of some or all of a deceased donor’s funeral ex-
penses [1-3,27,28]. Both of these types of incentives are
clearly “benefits” to the donor or donor’s family, and
therefore infringe existing provincial legislation.
Providing full or partial reimbursement of a living do-
nor’s expenses has also been suggested as a way to in-
crease donation frequency, and this approach has been
adopted by a number of provinces [13,14]. For example,
Ontario has the “Program for Reimbursing Expenses of
Living Organ Donors” which allows donors to claim up
to $5,500 for out of pocket expenses [13]. Québec has a
similar program [14]. While these programs are hardly
generous – indeed, research has shown that the personal
financial costs of organ donation often far exceed the
$5,500 limit [12]– they may nevertheless infringe the
ban on the exchange of valuable consideration in return
for an organ. Many policy documents seek to draw a
clear distinction between incentives and the repaying ex-
penses (or removing “disincentives”) [29,30]. But from a
legal perspective, the line is not always clear. Simply de-
claring a payment to be a reimbursement or the removal
of a “disincentive” does not, in the eyes of the law, ne-
cessarily mean it could not be construed as a benefit or
valuable consideration. As we have seen in the context
of other debates, such as with surrogacy arrangements
[31,32], there is much debate about what is a legitimate
expense and when reimbursement crosses the line to
“payment”. Interestingly, Manitoba is the one province
that has amended its legislation to specifically provide
for an “exception as to expenses”, thus highlighting the de-
gree to which the provision of expenses could be problem-
atic (if not, why create the clarifying exception?). The
Manitoba law states that nothing in the act “prohibits re-
imbursement” to the donor, recipient of an organ or fam-
ily members [21].
A more complex type of incentive to donate organs is
what has been referred to as a “paired exchange program”,
wherein kidney donations are facilitated by pairing those
in need of a kidney with a willing but non-compatible
donor with other such individuals. These programs exist
throughout the world, including in Canada [33] and, if
perceived as a way of increasing the chance of the donor’s
intended recipient receiving an organ, can be viewed as
providing an incentive. In the US, the law that prohibits
the exchange of “valuable consideration” for organs was
amended to explicitly provide that the ban does not apply
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amendment highlights the reality that, but for the amend-
ment, the practice would be caught by the broad prohib-
ition against incentives.
Conclusion
There are significant distinctions – both real and seman-
tic – among various types of incentive schemes aimed at
increasing organ supply. At one end of the continuum
are initiatives that seem relatively benign, including re-
moval of disincentives and reimbursement of a donor’s
actual expenses. At the other end are schemes that more
clearly infringe the spirit of the existing laws, including
the outright purchase of organs, or payment of compen-
sation to the organ provider in return for the “donation”.
Other proposals seem to sit nearer the centre, in that al-
though they do not appear to involve the exchange of
cash for organs, they still have an obvious pecuniary
element (examples include payment of funeral expenses
and the provision of a tax credit).
The aim of all of these proposed and existing incen-
tives policies is to increase the supply of organs, thereby
reducing wait times and improving the likelihood that
those in need will eventually receive an organ [35]. Yet
although most agree on the ultimate goal, there is an on-
going debate in the transplant community around the
ethical acceptability of incentives for organ donation
[1,28]. The perspective favouring incentives appears to
be stronger in public opinion: recent research has found
that 71% of the Canadian public would support the use
of some form of financial incentive to increase donation
rates. A surprising 45% support the use of a regulated
system whereby monetary payment for organs [2] is
made to donors by the regulator.
Despite the increasing focus on such schemes, there re-
mains much uncertainty and imprecision in popular repre-
sentations of the law, which often reduce the legal rule
prohibiting the exchange of consideration to its most basic,
stating simply that “selling organs is illegal in Canada” [6].
Some organizations (such as the Kidney Foundation of
Canada [29]) have adopted policies that reject “economic
incentives” for organ donation, but nevertheless support
“reimbursement” of out of pocket expenses for living do-
nors, implying that there is an obvious difference between
the two practices. And other commentators have made
similar arguments [28]. But, as is clear from the above, the
current legal framework makes few distinctions. The pro-
hibition on incentives is a relatively broad ban that reaches
well beyond just the “selling of organs” and is relevant to
all policies that involve something that could be conceived
as “valuable consideration.”
And, despite the apparently definitive legislative state-
ments about what is proscribed and what is, by implication,
permitted, there is little to guide us, as far as governmentpolicy and legislative debates, in interpreting the rele-
vant statutes. It seems likely that the intent was for the
prohibitions to be broadly interpreted. The objective is,
rightly or not [27], to preserve the altruistic nature of do-
nation. During the enactment of the most recent version
of Alberta’s statute, for example, comments made by law-
makers emphasized the need to ensure that the giving of
an organ “must be as a gift, and we must see it as a gift”
[36]. Similar pronouncements can be found in earlier le-
gislative debates as well. During a 1983 legislative debate
in Ontario it was suggested that “We cannot change this
gift relationship with respect to human organ transplants”
[37]. In Alberta in 1973, it was noted that the then pro-
posed law “prohibits the sale of tissue … and it is a serious
offence to sell that tissue” [38].
If we are correct in our broad interpretation of the
prohibitions, Canadian policy is tremendously restrictive
in the context of incentives; so much so that most pro-
posed and existing incentive programs seem to have the
potential to violate the letter of the law. We want to be
very clear: we raise this point not to insist that these
programs and efforts be abandoned. Rather, our view is
that Canadian lawmakers need to take a close look at
the justifications for the sweeping prohibitions found in
the legislation. Based on emerging policy initiatives and
public sentiment [2], it is fair to say that existing law
may be out of step with current views and the needs of
the transplant community. Laws prohibiting the pay-
ment of consideration for organs were put in place at a
time when organ transplantation was in its infancy.
Transplantation is now a routine and cost-effective treat-
ment option in numerous disease contexts. And, as with
all new medical technologies, there has been a signifi-
cant shift in public sentiment around the ethical accept-
ability of solid organ transplantation since the first
successful kidney transplants in the 1950s [39].
In view of these factors, we urge a careful and critical
review of organ donation laws in all Canadian jurisdic-
tions, with a view to reconsidering the breadth of the le-
gislative restrictions around organ donation. Changing
legislation is not an easy task, but we can and should
start to consider the best and most efficient way to to-
ward policy reform. We recognize that the use of incen-
tives should be just one of a range of policy strategies to
increase the supply of organs. But Canada needs to have
laws that can accommodate innovative and ethically ac-
ceptable approaches to increasing the supply of organs.
There is a vast difference between permitting incentives
like payment of some or all of a deceased donor’s funeral
expenses or paired organ exchanges and allowing the
purchase and sale of organs. Even to the extent that
Canadians wish to maintain an organ donation system
that is premised on altruism (a concept that is itself
open to a great deal of interpretation), we think most
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we describe here are, if not ideal, at least preferable to
the status quo, in which many patients die waiting for a
life-saving organ transplant.
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